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INTHE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
NEVADA MOTOR RENTALS, 
INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
Case No. 
13603 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover a deficiency judgment, 
costs, and attorneys fees as the result of the defendant-
appellant's default under motor vehicle conditional sale 
agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT 
The court ruled in favor of the respondent's claim 
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against the appellant, Nevada Motor Rentals, finding 
that the respondent was entitled to a judgment for the 
unpaid balance on its claim against Nevada Motor 
Rentals on the seven trucks purchased under sales agree-
ments, less the net amount received by the plaintiff 
upon its sale of the trucks in January, 1972, and less 
any amount Nevada Motor Rentals would be entitled 
to as an offset on its counter-claim. The court also 
allowed the recovery of out-of-pocket expenses incurred 
in preparing the trucks for public sale and the holding 
of said sale. The court then ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction over W. J . Digby on a personal basis, and 
therefore dismissed him for lack of jurisdiction. The 
trial court then found that the seven trucks in question 
should have been sold in June of 1970 rather than Janu-
ary of 1972, and found that the defendant-appellant 
had been damaged by loss due to depreciation in the 
sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($40,750.00), which should be granted by way of off-
set, leaving a net judgment in favor of the plaintiff -
respondent, and against the defendant-appellant, Neva-
da Motor Rentals, Inc., in the sum of Forty-Seven 
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Seven and 09/100 
Dollars ($47,367.09), plus interest at the contract rate, 
and court costs in the sum of Five Hundred Five and 
91/100 Dollars ($505.91). The trial court refused to 
award attorneys fees to the plaintiff-respondent even 
though finding that attorneys fees had been contracted 
for in the agreement of the parties. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent has filed a cross-appeal 
and seeks the following relief: 
1. A reversal of the trial court's holding that the 
reasonable time when the seven trucks should have been 
sold was June 30, 1970, and a determination in its place 
that the trucks were sold at a reasonable time, which 
would result in the deletion of the offset in the judg-
ment in the defendant-appellant's favor in the sum of 
Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($40,-
750.00), which would result in an increase in the judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff-respondent in the addi-
tional sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($40,750.00). 
2. A determination that the court had jurisdiction 
over W. J . Digby who was, either directly or through 
the means of agency, doing business within the State of 
Utah sufficient to subject him to the jurisdiction of the 
court. 
3. A determination that the court erred in holding 
that no attorneys fees should be awarded the plaintiff, 
and a direction to the trial court to determine what at-
torneys fees were reasonable, and award them to the 
plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The plaintiff-respondent, is in basic agreement with 
many of the facts stated by the defendant-appellant. 
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Those are the facts found by Judge Croft in his Memor-
andum Decision of April 6, 1973, denying defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 620) Those facts 
are listed by number as set out under the defendant-
appellant's statement of facts, numbers 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 ; 
7; 8; part of 9, but excluding the wording ". . . and was 
the only contact which Nevada Motor Rentals had in 
the State of Utah."; 11, excepting the figure of "$217,-
603.05," which should be "$127,603.05"; 12; 13; 14; 
15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 20; and 24. The remaining state-
ment of facts made by the defendant-appellant, are not 
agreed with, inasmuch as they omit certain material 
aspects of the facts alleged, and to some extent make 
over-statements of facts unsupported by any evidence. 
The following additional statements of fact are 
pertinent and necessary to the appeal: 
1. Even though the seven trucks in question were 
driven to Mack Trucks, Inc.'s lot in Denver, Colorado, 
sometime after February 1, 1970, the plaintiff-respon-
dent did not assert any possessory right to said vehicles 
until January, 1972, at which time said vehicles were 
repossessed, put in a saleable condition, and sold. (R.18 
and Exhibit 17-P) 
2. Before the trucks could be sold after their re-
possession, out-of-pocket expenses totalling Two Thou-
sand Four Hundred Seventy-Seven and 31/100 Dollars 
($2,477.31) for preparing the trucks for and holding 
the sale in January, 1972, were necessarily incurred, 
and that same amount would have been incurred regard-
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less of when in point of time aHer February. 1U70. ^aid 
trucks had been sold. (R. 83, and Exhibit 17-P and 
18-P 
\ i t e r tile se\ * n l /ueks were abandoned »u the 
lot ot .Mack Trucks, in , . . 1 >*-n\ - • Colorado, and 
Mack Financial Corporation learned -! their abandon-
ment Do:, l")io-b\ ,M ' Let Sr-.'H < re requested by 
Maek !,,!ii!i-.',;i! i orporation to submit a proposal in 
disposing of the trucks at that time, and then agreeing 
upon how a deficiency would be handled and taken 
care of; but Don Digby, for Nevada Motor Rentals, 
failed to contact Mack Financial Corporation concern-
ing such a pp»|M-a! \x '<; I ~) 
•4. r rom ! l M nun the seven in i rk- in qiifNlion were 
abandoned on K; < Mark ' I ' n i u - i i Denver, 
Colorado ;i !ii she lime they were repossessed by Mack 
Fnnneia! v •• *p»--raiin5 n January , 1972, the maximum 
depreciation on each truck amounted to Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00), for a total of possible maximum 
depreciation of Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,-
000.00). (R. m > 
5. The transaction net ween Nevada Mwi.w Hml-
als, entered into jus t prior i<- the abandoment • •-! 'hi 
trucks by Scott lu .Se\ada M^h-i HeHai^ and then 
Nevada \l--n-r Rentals n» Mark I i h r involved 
not onl\ ht purchase or hai^i 'er of seven trucks, but 
aisf > .* in * ! rucking considerations including a meat haul 
out of Gooding. Idaho, and a beer haul from Colorado 
to Idaho fTM"-- , 
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6. Notice of the sale of the seven vehicles in ques-
tion, after their repossession in January, 1972, was 
given by publication in the Denver Post, the Rocky 
Mountain News, and the Adams County Almanac. 
Notice was also sent to the attorney for the Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc. dated January 11, 1972. (Exhibits 
5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and an unnumbered page between R. 453 
and 454, R. 690-691) 
7. The defendant-appellant, on February 15, 
1969, executed an extension of conditional sale agree-
ment for chattel mortgage, which covered transactions 
including the seven trucks in question in the lawsuit, 
and as a term of said contract agreed that if said contract 
was placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, 
it, as the buyer, would pay the reasonable attorneys 
fees incurred by the plaintiff-respondent. (Exhibit 3-P 
and 4-P) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E U T A H COURT H A S J U R I S D I C -
T I O N OVER N E V A D A MOTOR R E N T -
A L S , INC. 
The appellant, in its brief, characterizes the visit 
of Donald Digby, an officer and agent of Nevada Motor 
Rentals, Inc. in the State of Utah as a mere conversation 
in which no actual business was performed. This, how-
ever, is not born out by the record. The record reflects 
that Mr. Digby of Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. came 
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to Utah, and specifically to the office of Mack Financial 
Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah, for the express 
purpose of persuading them to contact Lee Scott of 
Boise, Idaho, and making arrangements with him to 
purchase the seven trucks in question from Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc. under a treasury transfer agree-
ment wherein he was to assume the obligation of Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc., without, however, relieving them 
of their liability to Mack Financial Corporation in the 
event Lee Scott defaulted on the payments. (R. 5) 
The entire situation which brought about the liti-
gation presently before the court had its origin with 
that visit of Mr. Digby, the Vice-President of Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc. with Mack Financial Corporation 
in the State of Utah. Title 78-27-24, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, cited and relied upon by the appellant in 
its brief gives the Utah Court jurisdiction over any 
person who, in person or through an agent, transacts 
" . . . any business within this State." 
After the business transaction was set up in the 
State of Utah by the appellant's Vice-President, the 
contract was then made so as to be performable within 
the State of Utah. 
This court's treatment of jurisdictional questions 
under the provisions of Title 78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953, in 
both the Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 
P . 2d 332, cited by the appellant, and in the decision 
handed down in Foreign Study League v. Holland-
American Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 49 P . 2d 244, has 
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been consistent with the generally accepted notion that 
jurisdiction of the court should be expanded where the 
rights of its inhabitants have been affected by some con-
duct carried on within the State. If the conduct of Mr. 
Digby, the Vice-President of Nevada Motor Rentals, 
Inc., in coming to Utah and arranging for a transaction 
which ultimately goes sour, and results in a dispute over 
responsibility for the payment of trucks, does not consti-
tute the doing of any business within the State, then it 
would be very difficult to formulate an instance in 
which a non-resident would under any circumstances be 
doing business within the State. 
In addition to that particular activity, the trucks 
of Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., which are leased to 
Digby Truck Lines, are operated through Utah and 
upon the public highways of the State of Utah, which, 
is an additional act of doing business within the State. 
(R. 156) 
P O I N T I I 
IF THE SALE OF THE SEVEN 
TRUCKS IN QUESTION WAS NOT 
"COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE," 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES, UNDER THE APPLICABLE 
LAW, WOULD BE THE ACTUAL 
LOSS CAUSED BY A FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE. 
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The trial court found in its findings of fact that 
the sale of the vehicles in 1972 was commercially un-
reasonable because it was delayed by a period of nearly 
two years. The court further found that the reasonable 
time when the seven trucks should have been sold was 
June 30, 1970, and that had the seven trucks in question 
been sold on June 30, 1970, they would have brought 
Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($40,-
750.00) more than they did when sold January 25, 1972. 
The court accordingly allowed the appellant as an off-
set against the judgment awarded to the respondent the 
sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($40,750.00). 
The appellant cites three "leading cases" that sup-
posedly represent a "majority view" where the court 
allegedly denied a deficiency where the sale was not 
commercially reasonable. In reading those three cases, 
however, the deficiency was denied not because the sale 
was commercially unreasonable, but because the debtor 
was not given notice of the sale by the creditor. That, 
of course, was one of the contentions of the appellant 
at trial and is also raised on appeal under another point; 
however, the trial court found that notice had, in fact, 
been given to the debtor-appellant by the creditor-res-
pondent. (R. 690, Finding #13) 
Appellant then goes on to argue that some courts 
under the old Uniform Conditional Sales Act also held 
that where a sale was commercially unreasonable that 
a deficiency judgment would not be allowed, and in 
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support thereof, they cite two West Virginia cases, one 
decided in 1926 and one decided in 1930. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has, for the 
most part, been adopted by the State of Utah, and all 
of the other states where any of the parties to the action 
had any business dealings, specifically provides that a 
debtor's exclusive remedy for violations of the act is a 
Section 9-507-(1) claim for damages. That section of 
the Utah Commercial Code is Title 70A-9-507 (1), 1953, 
and reads, as the Uniform Commercial Code, as follows: 
"If it is established that the secured party is 
not proceeding in accordance with the pro-
visions of this part, disposition may be ordered 
or restrained on appropriate terms and con-
ditions. If the disposition has occurred, the 
debtor or any person entitled to notification or 
whose security interest has been made known 
to the secured party prior to the disposition 
has a right to recover from the secured party 
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the 
provisions of this part. If the collateral is con-
sumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover 
in any event an amount not less than the credit 
service charge plus 10% of the principal a-
mount of the debt or the time-price differential 
plus 10% of the cash price." 
Neither that Section, nor any other section of the 
Commercial Code, suggests that the proper remedy is 
punitive in nature, as suggested by the appellant, which 
would deny a deficiency judgment to a secured party 
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who failed to comply with the Commercial Code by dot-
ting every "i" and crossing every "t," or in creating a 
presumption that after an improper sale, the actual 
value of the collateral is presumed to equal the debtor's 
obligation. 
In reading the Commercial Code, and the cases 
decided under it, it appears that the debtor's exclusive 
remedy after discovering that some aspect of the sale 
was commercially unreasonable, is a Section 9-507 (1) 
claim for damages. A case which illustrates this point 
is Abbot Motors, Inc. vs. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 
35, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 788 (1964). In that case, the court 
was dealing with a secured party's suit for a deficiency 
judgment after the secured party failed to proceed in 
accordance with Section 9-504(3). In agreeing with the 
creditor's contention that conducting a sale in other 
than a commercially reasonable manner does not bar 
the recovery, but only gives the debtor a Section 9-507-
(1) claim for damages, the court stated that the "Defen-
dant is not execused from his debt because of an error 
in the procedure of his secured creditor in applying the 
collateral upon his debt and unless it is plainly so pro-
vided by the statute." Id 43. 
The New York Supreme Court, in the case of 
Chase Manhatten Bank v. Lyon Hair, Inc., 8 U.C.C. 
Rep. 1121, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), agreed with the posi-
tion taken in Abbot and held that the debtor's contention 
that the secured party's failure to comply with Section 
9-504(3) absolved him of liability was without merit. 
The court simply reasoned that Section 9-507 sets out 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
the penalty for non-compliance with Section 9-504, and 
relieving the debtor from liability is not among the reme-
dies prescribed. •••!;•• 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar 
decision; however, that was concerning the notice pro-
vision violation of Section 9-504, and would, therefore, 
be a case contrary to those cited by the appellant in its 
brief under this point. See Grant County Tractor Com-
pany, Inc. v. Nuss, 496 P . 2d 966, 6 Wash. App. 866 
(1972). That was an action by a seller-creditor of a 
tractor and other farm equipment against the buyers 
for a deficiency. The creditor came into possession of 
the debtor's tractor, which was held as security, and in 
the course of events sold the tractor without first giving 
notice to the debtor-defendant. The trial court found 
that the balance due on the contract for that amount 
was $3, 507.00, but refused to enter judgment for that 
amount " . . . because plaintiff failed to give notice to the 
defendants of the sale of the tractor." The creditor 
excepted to the trial court's ruling, and filed the appeal. 
The Washington Supreme Court, in reversing the 
trial court's denial of a deficiency judgment, cited the 
line of authority relied upon by the appellant in this 
case, namely, Leasco case and the Skeels case, and 
then go on to adopt the other line of authority. In doing 
so, they state: 
"***The other line of authority holds that the 
failure to give notice does not prevent a de-
ficiency. Universal C.I.T. Credit Company v. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Bone, 453 S.W. 2d 37, (Ark. 1970); Weaver 
v. O'Meara Motor Company, 452 P . 2d 87 
(Alas. 1969) \T kW Ice Cream, Inc. v. Car-
riage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J . Super. 328, 258 A. 
2d 162 (1969) ; Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & 
Loan Corporation, 415 S.W. 2d 347 (C.A. 
Tenn. 1966). We adopt the reasoning of the 
second line of cases. 
"R.C.W. 62 A. 9-504(2), quoted above, pro-
vides that the debtor is liable for a deficiency, 
if there is no agreement to the contrary. 
R.C.W. 62 A. 9-507 (1), provides: 
'(1) If it is established that the secured 
party is not proceeding in accordance with 
the provisions of this part disposition may 
be ordered to or restrained on appropri-
ate terms and conditions. If the disposi-
tion has occurred, the debtor or any per-
son entitled to notification or whose 
security interest has been made known to 
the secured party prior to the disposition 
has a right to recover from the secured 
party in the loss caused by a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this part. 
'Under this provision, if the creditor fails 
to give notice to the debtor as required by 
R.C.W. 62 A. 9-504 (3), the debtor has a 
right to recover from the creditor any loss 
caused by the failure to give that notice. 
Thus, in the instant case, if the sale of the 
tractor without notice had resulted in a 
loss to the defendants, the defendants 
would have a right in the instant proceed-
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ing to claim that loss against the deficiency 
sought by the plaintiff. In view of this 
remedy, we are of the opinion the writers 
of the Uniform Commercial Code did not 
intend that the creditors' failure to give 
notice would result in a forfeiture of the 
creditors' right to a deficiency. See Hogan, 
Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C. 
L.J . 244, 257 (1969).' 
The appellants seek to broaden the application of 
Section 9-507 to the point of its being a punitive statute, 
and in doing so, read into it terms that it does not con-
tain. A logical analysis of that Section indicates that it 
is compensatory in nature, and that it sets out the remedy 
of the secured party to recover "any loss caused by a 
failure to comply with the provisions" of the act. That is 
the construction given it by the trial court wherein the 
trial court found that the loss occasioned by the failure 
to hold the sale in a commercially reasonable manner 
was Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($40,750.00). Even though the respondent does not 
agree with that figure, and will hereafter assert that the 
maximum amount of the offset should have been 
Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00), the re-
spondent takes the position that the court properly ap-
plied the damage statute of the Commercial Code by 
assessing damages rather than resorting to a harsh for-
feiture position advocated by the appellant. 
The trial court's application is consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's position taken in the case of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 U.2d 370, 335 P.2d 404, wherein 
the court announced its position as being opposed to 
forfeitures, and adopting the rule that damages rather 
than forfeitures are favored. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT H A V I N G F O U N D T H E 
A P P E L L A N T R E C E I V E D N O T I C E 
OF T H E SALE, T H E A P P E L L A N T S 
C O N T E N T I O N T H A T NO D E F I C I E N -
CY J U D G M E N T MAY BE A S S E S S E D 
W H E R E N O T I C E OF SALE IS AB-
S E N T OR D I F I C I E N T IS MOOT. 
Even though, under the provisions of Section 9-504 
(3), the notice requirement relied upon by the appellant 
is not required, the trial court found that, in fact, notice 
had been given. 
Sub-Paragraph (3) of Section 9-504 of the Com-
mercial Code does away with the necessity of notice if 
the "collateral is perishable or threatens to decline 
speedily in value, or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market." (Emphasis added.) The seven 
trucks in question were, as the trial court noted in its 
Memorandum Decision denying defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, were of the "type customarily sold 
on a recognized market," so there really was no need 
for a notice. (R. 633) 
The court did, however, after considering all of the 
evidence, including respondent's counsel's letter to the 
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appellant's counsel dated January 11, 1972, (unnumber-
ed page between R. 453 and R. 454) and the showing 
proof of publication in three newspapers of general 
circulation in the area where the sale was held (Exhibit 
5-P, 6-P, and 7-P), found that notice of the sale had 
been given to the appellant, (R. 690, Finding No. 13) 
The facts of the case before the court are also simi-
lar, and even identical on this point, with the facts of the 
earlier cited Washington Supreme Court case of Grant 
County Tractor Company v. Nuss, 496 P. 2d 966, 6 
Washington App. 866 (1972). In that case, as in the 
instant case where the debtor unilaterally and voluntarily 
delivered the seven trucks in question to Mack Trucks, 
Inc., with, according to their testimony, the express 
intention of giving them complete control of the security, 
noting that the debtor did the same thing in the Grant 
Company Tractor case, the Washington Supreme Court 
stated: 
" Further, it should be noted that defendants 
unilaterally and voluntarily delivered to plain-
tiff complete control of the security and gave 
written notice of their election to rescind the 
transaction. I t has been held that such conduct 
constitutes a waiver of the debtor's right to 
reasonable notice of an impending sale or 
estops the debtor from claiming a violation of 
the statute. Nelson v. Monarch Investment, 
Inv. Plan of Henderson, Inc. 452 S.W. 2d 
375 (C.A. Ky. 1970)" 
Also, even if the trial court had found that notice 
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had not been given, the remedy under the Commercial 
Code for that violation is also Section 9-507(1), which 
makes the debtor's exclusive remedy a claim for damages, 
and is not punitive in nature so as to deny him a defi-
ciency. That, however, does not even come into play in 
this case inasmuch as the trial court did make a finding, 
based upon competent evidence, that the appellant re-
ceived notice of the sale, both directly, and through its 
being published in three newspapers of general circula-
tion where the sale was held and where the appellants 
were doing business. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T R I A L COURT'S D E T E R M I N A -
TION T H A T T H E SEVEN V E H I C L E S 
I N Q U E S T I O N D E P R E C I A T E D I N 
T H E SUM O F F O R T Y T H O U S A N D 
S E V E N H U N D R E D F I F T Y DOL-
LARS ($40,750.00) I S INCORRECT, 
•P A N D T H E M A X I M U M AMOUNT OF 
D E P R E C I A T I O N , A N D T H E R E F O R E 
T H E A P P E L L A N T S M A X I M U M 
D A M A G E S , IS ONLY T W E N T Y - O N E 
T H O U S A N D D O L L A R S ($21,000.00). 
The testimony presented at trial concerning the 
value of the vehicles in question came from Mr. Roddy, 
who has been in the trucking business as a salesman and 
mechanic for many years for several different companies; 
Mr. Alward, who had been in the truck sales business 
for approximately one year at the time he saw "some 
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trucks" belonging to Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., and 
then three current employees of the appellant who testi-
fied they had certain sums of money that they would 
have been willing to pay for trucks, but which they 
admittedly would not have paid for the trucks without 
first having driven them, ascertained their mechanical 
condition, etc. 
The testimony of all of the witnesses was admittedly 
in conflict, and the trial judge, sitting as both the trier 
of the law and of the fact, had to make a determination 
from all of the evidence as to what the true facts were. 
The appellant relies heavily upon the testimony of 
Donald Digby to the effect that the trucks must have 
been worth $18,000.00 each inasmuch as he had entered 
into a recent business deal with Lee Scott to purchase 
the trucks for that sum of money; however, after Mr. 
Scott had the trucks for a few days he, for some reason 
or the other, returned them to Mr. Digby at Nevada 
Motor Rentals, Inc. Also, the transaction entered into 
between Scott and Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. involved 
more than the mere purchase of seven trucks, but also 
involved arrangements for meat hauls out of Idaho, and 
beer hauls into Idaho, and other transportation con-
siderations. (R. 161, R. 692) 
When Mr. Alward appraised a group of trucks at 
Nevada Motor Rentals' yard in Denver, Colorado, in 
January, 1970, he had been in truck sales for one year, 
(R. 186) He looked at a group of Mack Trucks and 
White Freightliners, 1967 and 1968 models, and made 
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appraisals for the purpose of offering a trade-in price 
on some of the used trucks in connection with a deal he 
was trying to make to sell them new trucks. (R. 195) 
At the time of trial in April, 1973, he did not have any 
appraisals with him, had not reviewed them prior to the 
trial inasmuch as he didn't know why he was appearing 
at trial, and had no idea of what trucks, by serial num-
ber, he had even appraised, but only that there were some 
1967 model and some 1968 model Macks and White 
Freightliners. (R. 184 - 187) 
The Nevada Motor Rental employees who testified 
that they would be willing to pay $16,000 to $18,000 to 
purchase a vehicle admittedly did not drive the vehicles, 
or otherwise test them, and would not have paid that 
kind of money for a truck without first driving it, having 
it tested, and otherwise determining that it was worth 
that kind of money, and their testimony was not, there-
fore, to the effect that the seven vehicles in question, 
or any of them, were worth anywhere near from $16,000 
to $18,000. (R. 207-225) 
John Roddy, who is the used truck manager of the 
Mack Trucks, Denver, Colorado, branch testified that 
he had made periodic appraisals of the seven vehicles 
in question from the time Nevada Motor Rentals aban-
doned the vehicles on the Mack Trucks' lot in Denver 
and produced copies of the appraisals made by him. 
(Exhibit B-19 and B-20) 
Mr. Roddy's experience in the heavy trucking 
business is extensive and goes back many years. In 
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addition to his employment with Mack Trucks, Inc. both 
as Service Manager and Used Truck Manager, he has 
been employed over the years by General Motors, Inter-
national Harvester, Colorado Kenworth, Ford Motor 
Company, and other trucking concerns. 
Having inspected and appraised the trucks from 
time to time during the two-year period they were on the 
Mack Truck lot in Denver, Colorado, he expressed an 
opinion, based upon his background and his knowledge 
of the trucks, that the units had depreciated in the toal 
sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) per unit 
over the two-year period. (R. 113) The total deprecia-
tion of the seven units was, therefore, according to Mr. 
Roddy's expert testimony, the total sum of Twenty-One 
Thousand Dollars. ($21,000.00) 
P O I N T V 
T H E OUT-OF-POCKET E X P E N S E S 
I N T H E SUM O F T W O T H O U S A N D 
F O U R H U N D R E D S E V E N T Y - S E V E N 
A N D 31/100 D O L L A R S ($2,477.31) 
W E R E N E C E S S A R I L Y I N C U R R E D 
TO P R E P A R E T H E TRUCKS FOR 
SALE, A N D W O U L D H A V E N E C E S -
S A R I L Y B E E N I N C U R R E D R E -
G A R D L E S S OF W H E N T H E TRUCKS 
W E R E SOLD. 
The appellant fails to cite any portion of the record 
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in support of the contentions raised in Point V of its 
brief. 
John Roddy, the Utah Truck Manager of Mack 
Trucks' Denver, Colorado, branch, who was involved 
with the sale of the trucks after reviewing the exhibits 
representing the Two Thousand Four Hundred Seven-
ty-Seven and 31-100 Dollars ($2,477.31) expended by 
Mack Financial Corporation in preparing the trucks 
for sale, including advertising them, and who was in-
volved in getting them ready for sale and conducting 
the sale, at the request of Mack Financial Corporation, 
testified that the charges were reasonable and necessary, 
and that the same charges would have been necessarily 
incurred regardless of when in point of time the trucks 
had been sold after they were abandoned on the Mack 
Trucks' lot by Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. (R. 83) 
The contention of Point V of the appellant's brief 
is, therefore, unsupported by the record, and the out-
of-pocket expenses incurred by the respondent in ad-
vertising the sale of the trucks, and in getting them 
ready for sale so as to obtain the best possible price for 
them, is a recoverable expense, as was found by the 
trial court. 
P O I N T VI 
T H E C O M P U T A T I O N OF T H E 
COURT OF T H E J U D G M E N T IN T H E 
SUM OF F O R T Y - S E V E N T H O U S A N D 
T H R E E H U N D R E D S I X T Y - S E V E N 
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A N D 09/100 D O L L A R S ($47,367.09) 
W A S CORRECT, U S I N G T H E F I G -
U R E S O T H E R W I S E F O U N D BY T H E 
C O U R T , B U T T H A T F I G U R E 
S H O U L D B E R E V I S E D U P W A R D 
A F T E R R E D U C I N G T H E A M O U N T 
O F T H E S E T O F F A W A R D E D I N 
FAVOR OF T H E A P P E L L A N T . 
The computation used by the court in arriving at 
the Forty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Seven 
and 09/100 Dollars, ($47,367.09), figure is as follows: 
Explanation Amount 
April 15, 1970, Payoff 109,673.97 
Interest to June 30, 1970 2,399.12 
Total Due on June 30, 1970 112,073.09 
Less Loss for Non-Sale as of 
June 30, 1970 -40,750.00 
Total Due after Adjustment on 
June 30, 1970 71,323.09 
Interest from July 1, 1970, to 
June 30, 1971 7,488.92 
Total Due as of June 30, 1971 78,812.01 
Interest from July 1,1971, thru 
January, 1972 4,827.24 
Total Due through January, 1972 83,639.25 
Costs of Sale 2,477.31 
Less Sales Price -44,700.00 
Balance After Sale 41,416.56 
Interest from February 1, 1972, 
to January 31, 1973 4,348.74 
Total Due as of January 31, 1973 45,765.30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
Interest from February thru 
May, 1973 1,601.79 
Total Amount of Judgment 47,367.09 
The trial court, in using the above figures, makes 
a clear and accurate accounting by breaking the figures 
at each occasion where a significant event occurred. By 
handling the accounting in that manner, the appellant 
is charged interest on the appropriate amount owing to 
the respondent within the frame work of time when 
certain significant events occurred to change the prin-
cipal amount the appellant owed the respondent. 
The appellant's contention was considered by the 
trial court both originally, and on the appellant's post-
trial motions, and was rejected by the trial court inas-
much as it did not consider the fact that the principal 
amount the appellant owed the respondent changed from 
time to time with the happening of certain events, and 
would, therefore, have to be computed separately for 
each change in the principal amount on which interest 
could be charged. The appellant's proposal, which was 
rejected by the trial court, was and is that interest 
should only be charged on the lowest amount of principal 
owed at any given time, rather than computed separately 
on the changing amount of principal owed as that 
amount would change with the occurrence of events as 
found by the court. 
The respondent, by way of cross-appeal, contends 
that the only figure that should be changed is the setoff 
in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
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Dollars, ($40,750.00), under the explanation of "Less 
Loss for Non-Sale as of June 30, 1970," and that said 
figure should be readjusted to a maximum of Twenty-
One Thousand Dollars, ($21,000.00), if the court finds 
that the trucks should have been sold on June 30, 1970, 
or completely eliminated, if the court finds that the 
respondent had no duty to sell the trucks as of June 
30, 1970. 
P O I N T V I I 
T H E R E S P O N D E N T D I D NOT H A V E 
AN O B L I G A T I O N TO R E P O S S E S S 
T H E S E V E N TRUCKS I N Q U E S T I O N 
U N T I L T H E T I M E I T D I D SO, A N D 
T H E A P P E L L A N T I S NOT, T H E R E -
F O R E , E N T I T L E D TO A F O R T Y 
T H O U S A N D S E V E N H U N D R E D 
F I F T Y D O L L A R S , ($40,750.00), O F F -
SET, A N D T H E T R I A L COURT'S 
J U D G M E N T S H O U L D B E I N C R E A S -
E D BY T H A T AMOUNT. 
As set out in the appellant's Statement of Fact, 
the transaction involved in this case was not a clear-cut 
one-to-one transaction, but was complicated by the fact 
that after Scott Trucking Company acquired some in-
terest in the seven vehicles in question in a transfer be-
tween the appellant and itself, and agreed to by the 
respondent, Scott Trucking started returning the trucks 
to the appellant, who in turn took them to Mack Trucks, 
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Inc.'s Denver, Colorado, branch where they abandoned 
them. Thereafter, Mr. Adams of Mack Financial Cor-
poration attempted to get Scott Trucking and Nevada 
Motor Rentals to agree upon the disposition of the 
vehicles, and agree how the two interested parties would 
take care of a deficiency. After no response was received 
from Scott Trucking or Nevada Motor Rentals, a legal 
action was commenced to resolve the dispute, but be-
cause of jurisdictional problems, Scott Trucking Com-
pany could not be retained in the Utah action and re-
fused to cooperate in having the trucks voluntarily re-
possessed and sold. I t was not until January of 1972 
that the parties reached agreement that the trucks could 
be repossessed and sold without affecting the rights of 
the other parties involved, and immediately upon Scott 
Trucking Company's consenting to the repossession and 
sale the seven trucks were repossessed and sold within a 
very short period of time. 
While the Uniform Commercial Code may have 
given the respondent the right to repossess and re-sell 
the vehicles in question, it certainly did not impose upon 
it the duty to do so. To the contrary, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code specifically provides that the seller can 
elect the remedy that he wishes to pursue against the 
defaulting buyer under a security agreement. In Section 
9-501(1), it states: 
" When a debtor is in default under the security 
agreement, a secured party has the rights and 
remedies provided in this part . . . and those 
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provided in the security agreement. He may 
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or 
otherwise enforce the security interest by any 
available judicial procedure." 
The respondent in the instant case chose initially 
to pursue the remedy of requiring the defendant to pay 
on the contract. The respondent did not choose initially 
to repossess the vehicles and to sell them at public or 
private sale. Accordingly, the appellant should not be 
allowed to abandon the vehicles on the respondent's 
sister corporation's property, and force the respondent 
to elect the remedy of repossessing the vehicles. As noted 
above, the respondent did not repossess the vehicles 
until January of 1972, but to the contrary requested 
that the appellant remove the vehicles from its sister 
corporation's lot. 
In Auto Cars Sales and Service, Inc. v. Hansen, 
270 N.Y. 414, I N.E. 2d 830 (1936), a truck was sold 
by the plaintiff to the defendant under a conditional 
sales contract. The truck was damaged and the insur-
ance company insuring for the benefit of both the plain-
tiff and defendant, ordered that the truck be taken to 
the plaintiff- seller's lot. During the time the truck was 
on the plaintiff's lot, the plaintiff never offered to re-
turn the truck to the defendant, and the defendant never 
offered to pick it up, and there was never a demand 
made for its return. The defendant argued that inasmuch 
as the truck was in the possession of the plaintiff, he 
had repossessed the truck, and had failed to resell the 
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truck within the 30-day statutory period. The court 
rejected the defendant's argument, and pointed out that 
the plaintiff had never taken any steps itself or through 
the sheriff or any other agent to take possession of the 
truck, and that the plaintiff had not, within the meaning 
of the statute, repossessed the truck and therefore should 
not be denied deficiency judgment. 
In the instant case, not only did the plaintiff-re-
spondent, Mack Financial Corporation, not take any 
steps to repossess the trucks, but specifically demanded 
that the defendant-appellant get the trucks off the plain-
tiff-respondent's sister corporation's lot. 
A similar situation occurred in Brandon v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation, 223 Ark. 850, 268 
S.W. 2d 898 (1954), where the defendant-purchaser 
abandoned his automobile, and the creditor took posses-
sion of the automobile only to protect and preserve the 
automobile. The court ruled that there was no reposses-
sion under the contract at the time the automobile was 
abandoned, and that therefore once the vehicle was sold, 
the creditor was entitled to a deficiency judgment. In 
accord with that decision, is also Newberry v. Morris, 
233 Ark. 938, 349 S.W. 2d, 652 (1941). See also Kahl 
IK Winfrey, 81 Ariz. 199, 303 P . 2d 526 (1956), where 
the court ruled that a voluntary surrender of merchan-
dise was not a "re-taking" or repossession by the seller 
that would compel the re-sale within 30 days as provided 
in the statute. 
In light of the restrictions placed upon a creditor 
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in re-taking its security by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision of Fuentes, et. ah v. Shevin, et. al.y 407 
U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), the 
respondent was justified in not electing to repossess the 
vehicles until the time it repossessed them, and after 
repossessing them, considering the fact that they had to 
be conditioned for the sale, and the sale had to be ad-
vertised sufficiently, that the sale was totally reasonable, 
and the appellant should not have received the offset 
in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars, ($40,750.00), and that amount should be 
added to the judgment already entered by the trial court 
in respondent's favor. 
P O I N T V I I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO AWARD THE RESPON-
DENT ATTORNEYS FEES, AND THE 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF HAVING THE 
COURT TAKE EVIDENCE ON THAT 
POINT, AND ENTERING AN AWARD 
FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS 
FEES. 
The extension of conditional sale agreement or 
chattel mortgage executed between the appellant and 
the respondent, (Exhibit 3-P and 4-P), provides: "If 
this agreement shall be placed in the hands of an at-
torney for collection, the buyer shall pay to Financial 
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reasonable attorneys fees as specified in said document, 
if permitted by law." Based upon that provision for 
attorneys fees, the respondent sought recovery of its 
attorneys fees; however, the trial court denied the award 
of attorneys fees based upon the possibility that had the 
seven trucks in question been sold by June 30, 1970, the 
appellant may have paid the deficiency to the plaintiff 
on a voluntary basis, and thereby have avoided the law-
suit. There was, however, no evidence that they would 
have done so, and as a matter of fact, the respondent 
had filed its lawsuit against the appellant prior to that 
time. 
This court has recognized the rights of parties to 
contract and the court's obligation to enforce those 
contracts on many occasions. In particular, this court 
has recognized the rights of parties to contract for the 
payment of attorneys fees and have recognized the 
court's duty to enforce those contracts, leaving to the 
court the right to discipline the attorney if the fee 
charged is unconscionable. See Thatcher v. Industrial 
Commission, 207 P. 2d 178. 
Even though the Utah Supreme Court has never 
dealt with the exact question raised by the trial court's 
denial to award attorneys fees based upon the contract 
being sued upon, there is no authority known to the 
respondent whereby that provision of the contract should 
be disregarded where the court enforces all of the other 
conditions of the contract. 
The fact that the appellant continues to resist the 
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payment of anything to the respondent, even after the 
trial court awarded it a offset in the sum of Forty Thou-
sand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars, ($40,750.00), 
is indictive that at no point in time would the appellant 
have voluntarily settled a deficiency, but is evidence 
of the fact that the appellant has been and is totally 
unwilling to pay damage it has caused the respondent by 
its breach of the sales contract. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I t is respectfully submitted that the court should 
sustain the trial court's decision in part and reverse it 
in part, by deleting the offset in the sum of Forty Thou-
sand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars, ($40,750.00), 
and also directing the trial court to take evidence con-
cerning reasonable attorneys fees, and to award the re-
spondent its fees incurred for legal services in prosecut-
ing the action against the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & H A N N I 
By 
Wendell E . Bennett 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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